Post-crisis financial intermediation by MIHAI, Ilie & OPREA, Cristian
 9
 
POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
 
Ilie MIHAI* 
E-mail: mihai.ilie53@yahoo.com 
Cristian OPREA* 
E-mail: opreacristi0603@yahoo.com 
*Spiru Haret University, Bucharest 
 
 
Abstract  
The recent financial crisis that begun in 2007 in the US, which then 
swept around the world, has left deep scars on the already wrinkled face of the 
global economy. 
Some national and regional economies, which had money for expensive 
makeup, or created money1, managed to blur or hide the scars left by the 
crisis, others are still facing difficulties in overcoming the effects of this. 
The rapacity of banks, their greed and risk ignorance, were the origin of 
the outbreak of the last major economic and financial crisis but unfortunately 
those who were responsible or, rather, irresponsible, paid little or nothing at 
all for the burden of their bad loan portfolio. This cost has been supported by 
the population, either directly by paying high interest and fees [Mihai I., 
2007], or indirectly, through the use of public budgets to cover the losses of 
banks, most of which had private capital.  
In this context, we intend to examine the state of financial 
intermediation in Romania in the post-crisis period, and to primarily follow: 
(i) The structure and evolution of the banking system; (ii) Non-government 
credit situation; (iii) The level of savings; (iiii) Loan-deposit ratio; (v) The 
degree of financial intermediation and disintegration phenomenon etc., and to 
articulate some conclusions and suggestions on the matters that have been 
explored. 
Keywords: financial (dis)intermediation, loans, deposits, banking 
system, nonperforming loans, interest, inflation, foreign/Romanian capital 
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Developments in the Romanian banking system 
The effects of the recent economic and financial crisis made themselves 
strongly felt on the global and European banking system, states around the world 
                                                 
1
 In 2009-2011, the US Central Bank (FED) printed and injected into the market over 
2300 billion USD, the Central Bank of Britain the equivalent of approx. 315 billion USD 
and the European Central Bank, following the example of the British and the Americans, 
launched, staring with January 2015, a quantitative relaxation program totalling                         
1100 billion Euro. 
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having to face resounding bankruptcies [Lehman Brothers, 2008], important 
losses of budget revenues as a result of failure to achieve the expected profits of the 
banks and, in particular, huge public expenses for support and for avoiding chain 
collapse of banking institutions2, virtually all of them being private owned.  
In Romania, although the government has not directly allocated public money 
to support banking institutions with majority Romanian capital, the effects of the 
crisis have been felt by deep cuts, even the freeze of crediting, and failure to collect 
the expected budget revenue form taxes on the banking system, the banks having 
faced significant losses determined by a reduced banking intermediation and by the 
expenses related to the reorganising of bad loans balances. 
 Structural changes in the Romanian banking system in the post-crisis period 
are as follows (Table no. 1):  
 
Table no. 1 
Structural developments in the Romanian banking system 
Indicators 2009 2015 (June) 
A. Total credit institutions (1+2)  
                      of which:    
42 40 
     1. Majority private capital (1.1+1.2) 
                      of these: 
40 38 
          1.1. Majority foreign capital, of which: 35 34 
                 – Branches of foreign banks 10 9 
          1.2. Romanian majority capital 5 4 
     2. Majority state capital 2 2 
B. Shares of total banking assets (1+2) 
                       of which: 
100% 100% 
     1. Banks with majority private capital (1.1+1.2) 
           of these: 
92,5% 91,6% 
          1.1. Banks with majority foreign capital 85,3% 90,2% 
          1.2. Banks with Romanian majority capital 7,2% 1,4% 
      2. Banks with majority state capital   7,5% 8,4% 
Source: National Bank of Romania – Financial Stability Report, June 2009,                      
ISSN 1843-3235; National Bank of Romania – Financial Stability Report, September 2015, 
ISSN 1843-3235. 
 
In the analysed post-crisis period (2009-2015) the number of credit 
institutions operating in Romania decreased from 42 banks to 40 banks, through 
the exit from the system of: 
– Royal Bank of Scotland; 
– Volksbank, taken over by Banca Transilvania. 
Also in this period, the Romanian branch of Bank of Cyprus closed its 
operations in Romania. 
                                                 
2
 The financial effort of the USA for saving the banking system amounted to              
approx. 12600 billion USD. 
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At the same time, the number of Romanian majority capital banks (private 
and public) was reduced from seven banks to six banks through foreign takeover of 
the majority capital of Banca Transilvania.3 
Banks with majority private capital continue to hold shares in total bank 
assets of 91.6%, virtually all of them being of foreign majority capital, with 90.2% 
of share in total banking assets. 
The six banks4 with Romanian majority capital (private and public) have, 
together, only 9.8% market share, decreasing by approx. 5% compared with 2009, 
due mainly to the reclassification of Banca Transilvania from Romanian majority 
capital banks to that of foreign majority capital banks and to the removal of large 
value bad loans from the balance sheets. 
In banks with foreign majority capital, Banca Comercială Română5 continues to 
be the leader with a market share of nearly 20%, and between banks with Romanian 
majority capital, CEC Bank is the leader with a market share of approx. 7%. 
The Romanian banking sector, dominated by foreign capital, has 
“contributed” under the pretext of restructuring, to the disappearance of a important 
number of territorial banking units (branches and agencies) and numerous jobs 
(Table no. 2), Romania reaching the last place in the EU in terms of banking units 
and number of employees in the banking sector compared with the population 
(Table no. 3). 
 
Table no. 2 
Comparison between the number of territorial units and employees  
in the banking sector 
Indicators Jan. 1
st 
2009 
Dec. 31st 
2014 
Number 
differences 
Percentage 
difference 
Number of territorial banking 
units (branches and agencies) 6552 5337 -1215 18,6% 
Number of employees in the 
banking sector 71622 56850 -14772 20,6% 
Source: NBR, ARB. 
 
Table no. 3 
Banking degree 
Indicators Romania EU 
Number of inhabitants per employee in the banking sector 345 175 
Number of inhabitants per banking unit 3760 2450 
Source: National Bank of Romania – Financial Stability Report, September 2015, 
ISSN 1843-3235, p. 73. 
                                                 
3
 The selling by local stockholders of a significant package of shares to International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). 
4
  Romanian majority private banks: Banca Carpatica, Libra Bank, Banca Română 
pentru Credit şi Investiţii (founded by the uptake by Romanian investors of ATE Bank, in 
December 2013), Banca Centrală Cooperatistă Creditcoop, CECBank, Eximbank. 
5
 BCR is owned since 2007 by the Austrian group Erstebank. 
 12 
Banking system contribution to the income of the state budget has been 
decreased given that the banks have ended recent years with losses6. 
Thus, at the end of 2014, the Romanian banking system as a whole recorded 
losses amounting to 4.7 billion RON, with the following structure: 
– 23 banking companies reported losses amounting to a total of 6.4 billion 
RON; 
– 17 banking companies reported profit amounting to 1.7 billion RON; 
Of the units that reported losses, the largest amounts are found in the balance 
sheets of Banca Comerciala Romana, Volksbank, Bancpost etc. and among banks 
with a larger profit we mention Raiffeisen Bank, Banca Transilvania, City Bank 
România etc. 
Not knowing the local market and questionable training of top managers 
appointed by foreign shareholders in the management of banks operating in 
Romania, materialized in the lack of performance of banking companies led to 
frequent changes in the top management. 
Thus, many banks have had to change three or even more top managers in the 
post-crisis period.7 
 
Table no. 5 
Evolution of the inflation rate in the post-crisis period 
      – % – 
Indicators Annual inflation rate Target assumed by the NBR 
2010 7,96 3,0 
2011 3,14 3,0 
2012 4,95 3,0 
2013 1,55 2,5 
2014 0,83 2,5 
Source: NBR, annual reports on inflation 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014. 
 
The share of foreign currency loans in total nongovernmental credit slightly 
decreased in the analysed period, from 60.1% in December 2009 to 56.2% in 
December 2014 and still remains at a high level, with negative consequences on the 
risk of default, due to the unpredictable evolution of the RON exchange rate 
against major currencies.  
In addition, this situation draws an alarming increase in the number of 
litigations and disputes, both in court and in the street, between customers and 
banks, due mainly to requests of borrowers in foreign currency that the repayment 
of loans to be made at the historical exchange rate (at the date of credit 
contraction).  
 
                                                 
6
 With the exception of 2013, when the entire banking system recorded a small profit. 
7
 Banca Comercială Română: Dominic Bruynseels, Tomas Spurny, Sergiu Manea; 
Banca Română pentru Dezvoltare – GSG: Patrick Gelin, Guy Poupet, Philippe Lhotte etc. 
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Saving 
It is well known that supporting the lending process is performed to a limited 
extent on account of the own funds of credit institutions (approx. 10%- 15% of a 
banks resources are represented by equity), and the bulk of lending activities is 
based on funds raised by banks from retail and corporate customers (approx. 85%- 
90% of total resources). 
In these circumstances, the saving process is not just „rainy day money” for 
those who make the effort to save, but also a process with profound implications 
for a long-term healthy development of the economy. 
In the post-crisis period, the volume of savings expressed by deposits of 
nongovernmental residents (households and firms) evolved as follows (Table no. 6): 
 
Table no. 6 
Evolution of bank deposits                                                                                                                        
– mil. RON – 
Indicators Dec. 31 2009 
Dec. 31 
2014 % 
Total deposits of nongovernmental clients (1+2) 
                   of which: 
167742,1 231856,0 138,2 
1. Deposits in national currency (1.1 + 1.2) 
                   of which: 
102691,1 154879,8 150,8 
     1.1 Retail banking clients 59197,2 86165,2 145,6 
     1.2 Corporate banking clients 43493,9 68714,6 157,9 
2. Deposits in currency equivalent in RON (2.1 + 2.2) 
                   of which: 
65051,0 76976,2 118,3 
     2.1 Retail banking clients 38107,9 51868,4 136,1 
     2.2 Corporate banking clients 26943,1 25107,8 93,2 
 Source: NBR – Monetary indicators 2009; 2014. 
 
With all the difficulties caused by the crisis (cuts in salaries, pensions 
taxation, unemployment, inflation, etc.), nongovernmental residents (households 
and firms) continued to save, providing banks with numerous financial resource, 
which unfortunately, the latter have invested less in lending and more in funding 
the needs of the state, through the purchase of stocks and bonds. 
A questionable issue is the investment of resources derived from customer 
deposits, which usually have maturities of 1-3 years, in government securities 
whose maturities are higher, 5-10 years or more, thus infringing one of the golden 
rules on banks’ liquidity management. 
The total volume of nongovernmental residents’ deposits increased in the 
analysed period by 38.2%, of which: the ones in RON by 50.8%, while the ones in 
foreign currency equivalent in RON, by 18.3%. 
The process of saving was supported mainly by households, who had 
suffered most from the crisis (Table no. 7): 
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Table no. 7 
Structure of bank deposit holders     
                                – mil. RON – 
Indicators 
2009 2014 % 
2014/ 
2009 amount 
% 
in total amount 
% 
in total 
Total nongovernmental 
resident deposits (1+2) 
                          of which: 
167742,1 100 231856,0 100 138,2 
1. Household deposits (in RON 
or foreign currency equivalent 
in RON) 
97305,1 58,0 138033,6 59,5 141,9 
2. Corporate deposits (in RON 
or foreign currency equivalent 
in RON)                           
70437,0 42,0 93822,4 40,5 133,2 
Source: Processed data from the NBR – Monetary indicators 2009; 2014. 
 
The growth of household deposits in the analysed period was 41.9%, an 
average annual rate of 8.3%, while growth in corporate deposits was 33.2%, with 
an average annual growth rate of 6.64%. 
The populations’ behaviour and efforts in the process of saving are more 
laudable because, during the five years, the trend of interest was strongly 
decreasing, the NBR relying, through a drastic reduction of the reference interest 
rate (Table no.8), on a revival of lending, premise that has proven not to function, 
the mass of credit in nominal terms only slightly increasing over the five years 
(+5.9%), and in real terms, credit contracted (-12.53%). 
 
Table no. 8 
Evolution of the reference interest rate8 
                                                                                                                   – % – 
Indicators Reference interest rate 
Beginning of the year End of the year 
2009 10,25  8,00 
2010 8,00  6,25 
2011 6,25  6,00 
2012 6,75  5,25 
2013 5,25  4,00 
2014 3,75  2,75 
2015 2,50 1,75 (September) 
 Source: NBR, statistic data. 
 
                                                 
8
 According O.G. no. 13 / 24.08.2011, art. 3 (1) published in the Official Gazette,                 
no. 607/29.08.2011, as from 1 September 2011, the NBR reference interest rate is the 
interest rate monetary policy, which is also the financial and legal interest for operations 
and for the regulation of certain financial and tax measures. 
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Some aspects in the development of the loan/deposit ratio 
The structure and evolution of the loan/deposit ratio in the analysed period 
highlights some remarkable aspects and even inequities related to: 
• the involvement of shareholders of Romanian banks with foreign capital in 
finance/lending of the national economy; 
• unfair redistribution of resources between those who save and those 
receiving funding; 
• the mainly good use of financial credit for funding budget deficits to the 
detriment of lending to the economy; 
• leakage of national income across the borders through the mechanisms of 
financing/refinancing and transfer pricing; 
• excessive privatization of the banking system etc. 
Coverage of loans with deposits collected by local banks, calculated as the 
ratio of total nongovernmental deposits and loans is as follows (Table no. 9): 
 
                                                                                         Table no. 9 
Coverage of loans with deposits 
                                                                                                                           – % – 
Indicators 2009 2014 
Total coverage, of which (1+2): 83,9 109,5 
1. in RON (1.1 + 1.2) 
         of which: 
128,8 167,2 
    1.1  retail 152,5 199,6 
    1.2  corporate 106,3 132,2 
2. in foreign currency equivalent  
    in RON (2.1 + 2.2) 
           Of which: 
54,1 64,7 
    2.1. retail 62,1 83,5 
    2.2. corporate 45,9 44,1 
   Source: Processed data from the NBR – Monetary indicators 2009; 2014. 
 
If during the full economic and financial crisis loans were covered by local 
deposits at a rate of only 83.9%, at the end of 2014 the situation reversed, deposits 
exceeding the mass of nongovernment credit by 9.5%, the causes being multiple, of 
which we mention two as being the main ones: 
• reduction of loan portfolio by removing bad loans from banks’ balance 
sheets, while freezing credit activity; 
• customer behaviour, especially that of the population, which during the 
crisis, continued to save “rainy day money”. 
A special situation is that of loans in foreign currency which were covered by 
foreign currency deposits in proportion of 54.1% in 2009 and 64.7% in 2014, 
which created difficulties for customers, especially the population, which could 
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lend foreign currency, taking upon themselves the risk of the exchange rate, with 
negative consequences in the future repayment capacity. 
The evolution of the structure of loans coverage with deposits sows that, in 
fact, shareholders of foreign banks operating in Romania have reduced to zero their 
contribution of equity to debt financing of the Romanian economy, as the volume 
of deposits collected locally exceeds the mass of credit (109.5% at the end of 
2014). 
Although through the Vienna Agreement9, the main nine foreign banks with 
subsidiaries in Romania pledged not to reduce their exposure in our country, in 
reality, these exposures have been reduced steadily. 
In addition, some foreign banks have issued securities directly on the 
Romanian market in order to attract financial resources.10 
The structure of the coverage of loans with local deposits also highlights 
some inequities between customer categories that make efforts to save and those 
who receive loans (Table no. 10), the disadvantaged ones being the population 
which contribute with deposits larger by 34.3% than loans which they enjoy, in the 
favour of companies which had deposits smaller by 13.8% than the loans they 
contracted, at the end of 2014. 
  
Table no. 10 
Coverage of loans with deposits by categories of clients 
                                                                                                              – % – 
Indicators 2009 2014 
Total coverage, of which  83,9 109,5 
retail 97,1 134,3 
corporate 70,7 86,2 
   Source: Own calculations according to the NBR – Monetary indicators 2009; 2014. 
 
Degree of (dis)intermediation 
The degree of financial intermediation represents the level and impact 
that the financial-banking assets have on the economic development and is 
calculated as follows: 
Dfi = 
Fa                
× 100 
GDP 
 
where: Dfi = degree of financial intermediation 
            Fa = total financial assets 
            GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
                                                 
9
 The Vienna Agreement – understanding signed in Vienna in March 2009 by the 
nine major foreign banks with subsidiaries in Romania, under the auspices of the IMF and 
EC, through which foreign shareholders of Romanian banks pledged not to reduce 
exposures to Romania in the coming years. 
10
 In the summer-autumn of 2015 Erste Bank Austria launched an issue of 
subordinated bonds in RON on the Romanian market which amounted to 135 mil. RON 
with an annual output between 6.50% and 6.75%. 
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On July 30 2015, the degree of financial intermediation in Romania was 
77.4%. 
If out of the financial assets only banking assets are taken into account, then 
the degree of banking intermediation is obtained. 
In the post-crisis period, the degree of banking intermediation in Romania 
has evolved as follows (Table no. 11): 
 
Table no. 11 
Evolution of the degree of banking intermediation 
                                                                                                                         – % –  
Indicators 2009 2014 (T2) 2015 (T2) Dif. 2015 (T2)-2009 
Degree of banking 
intermediation 75,0 61,6 60,3 -14,7 
Source: Own calculations according to the NBR, Report on financial stability, 
September 2015, p. 70-80. 
 
Therefore, the degree of financial intermediation and that of banking 
intermediation, representing 78% of total financial assets, is recording a continuous 
downward trend, thus occurring the phenomenon of banking disintermediation. 
This, while the degree of banking intermediation in Romania is about 5 times 
less than the average level of banking intermediation recorded in the EU 28 
 
                                                                           Table no. 12 
Degree of banking intermediation in some EU countries 
                                                                                                             – % – 
Indicators % 
EU 28 average 320 
Bulgaria  121 
Hungary  120 
Poland 92 
Lithuania  70 
France 380 
The Netherlands  375 
Portugal 302 
Austria  295 
         Source: NBR. 
 
In the post-crisis period we are rather witnessing a phenomenon of financial-
banking disintermediation resulting in reducing the share of financial-banking 
assets relative to the GDP, the trend in Romania being opposite to the situation in 
the EU 28, for which the share of banking assets in the consolidated GDP is over 
320%. 
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Conclusions and proposals 
The study on the evolution of financial intermediation in Romania between 
2009 and 2014 highlights some conclusions and proposals, as follows: 
• the Romanian banking sector regressed in quantity in the post-crisis period, 
through the disappearance from the system of some banking institutions and some 
subsidiaries owned by foreign banks in Romania, and also by the reducing number 
of territorial banking units (subsidiaries and agencies) and that of workplaces in the 
banking system; 
• the percentage of Romanian capital(private and public) in total banking 
capital is insignificant (below 10%), and the market share of banks with Romanian 
private and public capital records a trend of further reduction, with negative 
consequences on the effectiveness of government policies correlation with 
financial-banking ones; 
• compression of financial intermediation, expressed by the reduction of the 
mass of loans in real terms by 12.53% during 2009-2014, created difficulties for 
the recovery of the economy which lacked financial resources, both on the 
monetary market and on that of capital; 
• the further maintenance of a high share of foreign currency loans in total 
nongovernmental loans (56.2% at the end of 2014), with a negative impact on the 
reimbursement abilities of clients through the evolution of exchange rates of the 
national currency in relation with major currencies; 
• even with all the adverse effects of the economic-financial crisis, the 
population continued to save, the growth of bank deposits being higher than that of 
loans, so that at the end of 2014, bank deposits have exceeded loans’ mass by 
almost 10%; 
• distribution, sometimes discriminatory, of loans on customer categories in 
relation to the structure of deposits, the population being disadvantaged (59.5% of 
bank deposits were held in late 2014 by the population and only 48.5 of the loans’ 
mass was contracted by it); 
• foreign shareholders of the banks operating in Romania have continuously 
reduced exposure in our country in the post-crisis period, trying to cover additional 
capital requirements imposed by Basel III, through subordinated loans based on 
resources collected from the local market. 
In order to correct, if possible, the shortcomings that arise from the research, 
it is necessary, in our opinion, to: 
• genuine involvement of banks in financing the economy through the 
resumption of lending in retail and corporate, based on viable projects by targeting 
lending resources to such projects, rather than to finance public deficits; 
• consolidated supervision of the financial market through a single 
independent authority, to be framed by professionals in the field; 
• ensuring a stronger position of domestic capital (public and private) in total 
private capital, both through redemption by the State of stakes held by foreign 
investors in Romanian banks, and also through encouraging domestic capital to 
establish banking companies or to takeover stakes in existing credit institutions; 
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• promotion by the authorities of regulations designed to ensure equal 
opportunities and treatment of customers in relation to banking institutions, 
particularly with regard to unfair terms in contracts, partnership in taking risks, 
litigations, etc. 
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